APPILIED TO CRIMES AND

MISDEMEANORS.

the party for such contempt, is in itself essentially a criminal proceeding
or not, we do not find it necessary to decide. We simply hold that, whatever its nature may be, it is an offence against the Court and against the
admistration of justice, for which courts have always had the right to punish the party by summary proceeding and without trial by jury, and that
in that sense it is due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution."
The sentence to which Mr. McMurtrie refers, in the previous article,
is found in the next to the last clause of the opinion of the Court, and is
as follows:
" If the objection to the statute," says Mr. Justice MILLER, "is that it
authorizes a proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to suppress the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, which are by law prohibited,
and to abate the nuisance which the statute declares such acts to be,
wherever carried on, we respond that, so far as at presentt advised, it
appears to us that all the powers of a court, whether at common law or at
chancery, may be called into operation by a legislative body for the purpose of suppressingthis objectionabletraffic; and we know of no hinderauce in the Constitution of the United States to the form of proceedings,
or to the Court in which this remedy shall be had. Certainly,it seems to
us to be quite as wise to use the processes ofthe law and the powers of the
Court to prevent the evil as to punish the offence as a crime after it had
been committed."
It remains but to note that the case opens but leaves unanswered
two interesting questions of constitutional law : First, whether a State
can deprive her citizens of the right of a trial by jury according to
common law forms; second, whether a State, granting that she can
abolish the jury system in loto, can abolish it in regard to a certain
class of crimes,, while retaining it in trial of other crimes.
Besides these constitutional questions, the Court, in the sentence
above quoted, refused to decide the question raised by the counsel, and of
which the foregoing article is so clear an exposition, viz. : whether the
proceeding instituted by the statute is essentially a criminal proceeding.
W. D. L.
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WHEN POWER TO SELL INCLUDES POWER TO
MORTGAGE.

It may be said to be moderately well settled that a
mere power to sell does not include a power to mortgage.'
iSugden Vendors (Sth Am. ed.).*" 396; 2 Washburn Real Prop. (4th
ed.), 655, p1. 5; 3 Redfield Wills (3d ed.), 549.
2
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Thus a mere power in a power of attorney to sell real estate confers no power to mortgage.' But the chief difficulty in determining whether a power to sell includes a
power to mortgage arises when, as is often the case in wills,
the power to sell is coupled with a trust to raise money -out
of the estate to pay debts or other charges. Where there
is a direction to pay debts or charges, nothing being said
as to how the money shall be raised, it has been held that
this implies not only a power to sell,2 but also a power to
mortgage, if that method of raising money be more advan.
tageous to the estate than a sale.' If, however, the will
or other instrument expressly authorizes a sale, the question arises whether the power to sell includes, or is to be
considered as negativing, the power to mortgage. Most
of the authorities agree in holding that if 'itclearly appears
from the will or other instrument that the intention of the
donor of the power in directing a sale was that his real
estate should be absolutely converted into money, or, to
use the common expression, that there should be an "outand-out" sale, then no power to mortgage will be implied.'
The rule is very clearly expressed by Mr. SPENCE, as
follows: "Generally speaking, a power to sell implies a
power to mortgage; but a mortgage is not a proper execution of the trust where the clear, manifest intention of the
testator is that the estate should be sold out and out, and
that there should be a complete conversion of his real estate,
and that the produce of his real and personal estate should
be disposed of as money." 5
In several of the cases which are often cited in support
of the broad proposition that a power to sell does not imply a power to mortgage, the intention of the testator that
his real estate should be sold "out and out" was clearly
1

Jones' IMortgages ( 3 d ed.), See. 129; Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Cush., I17;
Morris v. Watson, I5 Minn., 212.
2
Hill Trustees (4th Am. ed.),* 345 ; 2 Perry Trusts (4th ed.), Sec. 766.
3Hill Trustees (4th Am. ed.),* 355; I Jones' Mortgages (3th ed.),
Sec. 129.
' Hill Trustees (4th Am. ed.),* 355.
2 Spence Eq. Jur., * 369. See also i Lewin Trusts (ist Am. from 8th
Eng. ed.),*425; 2 Perry Trusts ( 4 th ed.), Sec. 768.
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manifest upon the face of the will.' And it was upon a
similar construction of the will that the decision was based
in the leading case of Strongbill v. Anstey.2 On the other
hand, where it is apparent that the primary purpose of the
testator is not to convert the estate into money, but is to
pay the debts or other charges with which it is charged,
and this purpose may be equally as well or better accomplished by a mortgage, the power to sell will imply a
3
power to mortgage.
But suppose that there is a power to sell, coupled with
a trust to pay debts or other charges, but there is nothing
else upon the face of the will by which to determine
whether or not it was the testator's intention that there
should be an " out-and-out" sale, -what is the presumption in such case? Upon this question the authorities are
not harmonious. Some hold that in the case supposed the
power to sell will not be construed as a power to sell out
and out ; and that such a power, coupled with such a trust,
without more, implies a power to mortgage. In other
words, that this is the presumed intent of the testator, unless a contrary intent is"
clearly manifest from other parts
of the will. "It seems," says Mr. HILL, " that a trust to
sell lands for the payment of debts will authorize a mortgage for that purpose, which is a conditional sale, unless,
indeed, it be the clear intention of the testator in directing
the sale, that his real estate should be absolutely converted." ' This was expressly decided in the leading case
of Ball v. Harris.' In that case a testator charged his lands
with the payment of his debts, and then authorized the
trustees to whom the lands were devised to sell them and
invest the proceeds in other lands, with further power to
sell these also in execution of the trusts specified in the
1Haldenby v. Spofforth, i Beav., 390; Page v. Cooper, i6 Id., 396;
Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Id., 86.
" i De G. M. & G., 635. See the comments on this case in Hill Trustees k4th Am. ed.). 536, note i.
3i Lewin Trusts (ist Am. from 8th Eng. ed.),425; 2 Perry Trusts
(4th ed.), Sec. 76S; 3 Redfield Wills (3d ed. ),549. See also Sugden Vendors (Sth Ain. ed.),396 ; 4 Kent Coin., * 147.
4Hill Trustees (4th Am. ed.), 355. See also 2 Spence Eq. Jur., 369.
54 MIyl. & Cr., 264.
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will. Beyond this there was nothing upon the face of the
will to indicate whether the testator did or did not intend
an out-and-out sale. The trustees made an equitable mortgage of the lands devised by a deposit of the title-deeds,
and it was contended that they had no power to do so.
But the Court held that the primary object of the testator
was to raise money to pay debts, and that the power
to sell for that purpose did not negative a power to
mortgage, if that was the best method of effecting

the

primary

object

of the

testator.

COTTZNHAM,

L. C., said: "So long ago as the case of Mills v.
Banks,' in 1724, it seems to have been assumed that 'a
power to sell implies a power to mortgage, which is a conditional sale,' and no case has been quoted as throwing
any doubt upon that proposition. But this is not a mere
power to sell ; it is a trust to raise money out of the estate
to pay debts. It would indeed be most injurious to the
owners of estates charged if the. trustee could effect the object of his trust only by selling the estate."
The reasoning of this case, it will be observed, applies
to all cases where the primary object of the testator is to,
raise money, whether the purpose of raising the money isto pay debts or is to execute some other trust imposed
upon the trustee. And this reasoning accords with the general rule for the construction of powers. "The intention
of the donor of the power is the great principle that governs in the construction of powers ; and in furtherance of
the object in view, the courts will vary the form of executing the power, and, as the case may require, either enlarge
a limited to a general power, or cut down a general power
to a particular purpose." ' It accords also with the familiar rule in the construction of wills, that a will should
be construed in such a way as will most effectually carry
out the manifest primary intent of the testator, even if, in
order to do so, it may be necesssary to reject some particular or special intent.3
13 Peere Will, t.
3

4 Kent's Com1.fi 345.

1 Redfield Wills (4th ed.), 433;

cott's ed.), 53,* 480.

2 Jarman

Wills (Randolph & Tal-
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The case of Ball v. Harris was cited, and not disapproved, in Stronghill -,.
Anstey, supra, and has ever since
continued to be the law in England. ' In the case last cited
the rule, as above stated, was applied to uphold a mortgage
nmade by one trustee to his co-trustees.
Recent well-considered American cases are to the same
effect. In Loebenthaler v. Raleigh, 2 there was a will containing this clause : "If it should seem necessary at any
time to dispose of a portion of my real estate for the payment of my debts, I hereby give my executors power to do
so, either at public or private sale." The estate included
a large tract of land which it was difficult to sell to advantage. It was held that the will conferred a power to mortgage. "It is to be observed," says the Chancellor, RuxYox, "that the testator did not by this provision contemplate a conversion for any other purpose than the payment
.of debts, nor to any greater extent than might be deemed
necessary for that object. His design was to give his executors power to convert his real estate, to the extent that
they might deem necessary, for the payment of his debts.
" Mr. FISHER lays it down that a power for trustees to
mortgage is sometimes implied in a power to sell, viz.:
where to satisfy the terms of the proposed object of the
power-as, for instance, to raise a particular charge, subject to which the estate is devised-it is not necessary to
make an absolute conversion.' Where power of sale is
given to raise a particular charge only, and the purpose
can be answered better by mortgage than by sale, and that
method is not violative of the intention of the grantor of
the power, the former mode of raising money should be
preferred to the latter, for the obvious and sufficient reason
that it is for the advantage of the estate that it should be

ISee also Earl of Oxford v. Earl of Albemarle (Shadwell, V.C., 1848),
17 Law Journ. H.S.Ch., 396; n re Dimmock (Kay,
J., 1885), 52 Law Times
H.S., 494'3 6 N. J. Eq., 169.
-'Citing Fisher on Mortgages, See. 435. The cases of Stronghill v.
Anstey, I De G. M. & G., 635; Page v. Cooper, t6 Beav., 396; and Ball v.
Harris, 4 My1. & Cr., 264, are authorities on this point.
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adopted, and it is within the limits of the power intended
to be conferred."
It would be absurd, to say the least of it, to adhere
so closely to the literal terms of the grant of power as to
necessitate a sacrifice of the property, when by a reasonable construction that result could be avoided.
Lord
in
commenting
Spofforth,'
Haldenby
v.
LANGDALE, in
on Lord MACCLESFIELD's remarks in Mills v. Banks,' that
"a power to sell implies a power to mortgage, which is a
conditional sale," says he conceives this to mean that
where it is intended to preserve the estate, there, under a
direction of sale, a mortgage will sufficiently answer the
purpose. And Lord ST. LEONARDS, in Stronghill v. Anstey, ubi sz., says: "It ought, I think, to be considered
that in a case where the trustees have a legal estate, and
are to perform a particular trust through the medium of a
sale, although a direction for a sale does not properly authorize a mortgage, yet where the circumstances justify the
raising of the particular charge by a mortgage, it must be,
in some manner, in the discretion of the Court whether
it will sanction that particular mode or not. It may be
the saving of an estate and the most discreet thing that can
be done; and as the legal estate would go, and as the purposes of the trust would be satisfied, I think it impossible
for the Court to lay down that in every case of a trust for
sale to raise particular sums, a mortgage might not, under
the circumstances, be justified."
The rule is truly expressed by Mr. HILL as follows: "A power for trustees to
sell will authorize a mortgage by them, which is a conditional sale, whenever the objects of the trust will be answered by a mortgage; as, for instance, where the trust is
to pay debts or raise portions. But where the trusts declared of the purchase money show that the settlor contemplated an absolute conversion of the estate, a mortgage will
be an improper execution of the power."'
This case must
be considered as emphatically overruling anything to the
contrary in the previous case of Ferry v.Laible,4 which is
i Beav., 39 o .
Citing Hill Trustees, 475.

"3 Peere Vill., i.
4 31 N. J. Eq., 566.
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not even cited, and is apparently utterly ignored, in the
opinion of the Chancellor.
The case of Loebenthaler v. Raleigll, sufira, was approved by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the
recent case of Kent z. Morrison.' In the case last cited
real estate was devised to the wife, " with full power to
sell and convey the same by deed (part or all of it); the
proceeds thereof are to be used for her comfort and otherwise as she may think proper." Notwithstanding the specific direction that the power should be executed by deed,
the Court held that the power included a power to mortgage, and that it might be executed by a guardian for the
wife, she having become insane, under a license from the
Probate Court. The Court distinguishes the prior case of
Hoyt z,.
Jacques, 2 as belonging to that class of cases where
the intention of the donor of the power is that the real
estate shall be converted out and out into money. The
Raleigh, szqfra, was also followed in
case of Loebenthaler z,.
the well-considered case of Waterman v. Baldwin,' which
must be regarded as overruling anything to the contrary
in the previous case of Hubbard v. German Catholic Cong.4
To the same effect is the recent and well-reasoned case of
Faulk v. Dashiell. ' Other authorities, particularly those
in Pennsylvania, go much further, and hold that a power
to sell, even though not coupled with a trust to pay debts
or raise charges, implies a power, unless it is clearly negatived, to mortgage: Zane z. Kennedy ;6 Steifel z'. Clark.'
The case of Steifel 7. Clark distinguishes and controls the
prior case of Head v. Temple,' in Tennessee.
But there are also authorities of great weight, holding
that a power to mortgage cannot be implied from a power
to sell, though coupled with a trust to pay debts or other
charges out of time proceeds ; that a power to raise money
by a sale negatives a power to raise money by a mortgage,
and frinzafacie is to be construed as a power to sell " out
26 N. E. Rep., 427.

34 Iowa, 31.
9 Baxter (Ten.). 466.

129 MNass., 2S6.
::68 Iowa. 255.
62 Texas, 642.
'3
73 Ila. St.. 18z
4 Heisk. (Tenn.). 34.
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and out." The leading case in support of this doctrine is
Bloomer v. Waldron,I and represents the opposite extreme
from the Pennsylvania cases. The opinion of COWEN, J.,
is based upon a very narrow and rigid common law construction of powers, and discloses a marked hostility to the
more liberal rules of equity. The authority chiefly relied
on in support of the opinion is Holdenby v. Spofforth,2
before cited, in which, as already stated, the intent of the
testator, that there should be an "out-an-dout" sale was
clearly manifest. COWEN, J., even intimates a strong
doubt as to the rule, now perfectly well settled, that a general power to raise money out of rents and profits implies
a power to sell or mortgage. And finally, in respect to
curing a defective mortagage by a subsequent exercise of
the power of sale, the opinion is materially modified, if not
overruled, by the later case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Woods.
In Hoyt v. Jaques,' it was held "that under a will a
trust with a power to sell frima facie imports a power to
sell 'out and out,I and will not authorize a mortgage unless
there is something in the will to show that a mortgage was
within the intention of the testator."
But this statement
is qualified by what follows: " It has been held that where
the sole object and purpose of the testator, in conferring
the power, was to pay debts or a particular specific charge
upon the estate, and the estate itself is devised subject to
that charge, such power to sell may authorize a mortgage;
but, where it appears from the will that the intention of the
testator was to sell the estateand convert it absolutely, a
mortgage by the donee of the power to sell is void. ' 5 If
the case of Hoyt v. Jaques can be construed as deciding
anything more than that a power to sell does not include a
power to mortgage, when the manifest intent of the donor
is that the real estate shall be sold out and out and cono.
'.3 Hill (N. Y.), 361.
2 1 Beav., 39
3 121 N. Y., 302; see also U. S. Trust Co. v. Roche, 116 N. Y., 120.
4 129 lass., 286.
5Citing, amongst other authorities, Ball z. Harris, 4 THyl. & Cr., 264.
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verted into money, it must be deemed to be limited by the
subsequent case of Kent z. Morrison, above cited.'
Some of the cases which are cited in the text-books as
in accord with those last referred to are not so in fact.
Thus in Green v. Claiborne,2 it was expressly provided in
the deed of settlement that there should be a sale of the
trust property and a reinvestment of the piroceeds in other
piroperty zupon the same trusts, which the Court held to
indicate that the grantor intended an absolute sale. Even
upon this theory, however, the decision cannot well be reconciled with that in Ball z'. Harris, su-ra.
In Butler v. Gazzam, 3 the conveyance to the trustee,
besides authorizing a sale and reinvestment of the proceeds,
expressly provided that the land should be kept free from
incumbrance.'
Of Ferry v. Laible, sutra, which is cited in the
previous note, it is to be observed that it was a decision of
the Vice-Chancellor, and that it is virtually overruled by
the decision of the Chancellor in the later case of Loebenthaler v. Raleigh, above referred to. The cases of Hubbard
v. German Catholic Cong., and Temple z'. Head, must also
be deemed to be qualified and limited by the later cases in
the same courts, of Waterman v. Baldwin, and Steifle v.
Clark, supira.
The authorities which hold that a power to sell,
though coupled with a trust to pay debts or charges, pirima
fade implies an " out-and-out"
sale and negatives a
power to mortgage, seem not to attach sufficient importance to the distinction between a discretionary power to
IThe

following, though not going to the full extent of the two cases,

last cited, may be regarded as more nearly in harmony with then than
they are with the case of Ball v. Harris, supra, and the cases in accord
with it: Tyson v. Latrobe, 42 Maryl., 325 . . . (in this case BARTOr.,
Ch. J., dissented in an elaborate opinion); Wilson v. M1aryland Life Ins.
Co.. 6o Id., 15° ; Price v. Courtney, S7 -1o., 387; Stokes v. Payne. 58
Miss., 614. See also i Lewin Trusts (Tst Ani. from Sth Eng. ed.), 425.
83 Va., 3 S6.
: 8i Ala.. 491.
4The following cases are also cited in soine of the text-books in support of the proposition that a power to sell prima facie implies an "outand-out" sale and negatives a power to mortgage : Ferry v. Liable, 31 N.
J. Eq.. 566; Hubbard v. German Catholic Cong.. 34 Iowa. 31 : Temple
v. Head. 4 Heisk. (Tenn. 1. 34.

